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THE AMERICAN CORPORATION IN AMERICAN
FOREIGN TRADE: A CASE OF ILL-DEFINED
PRIVATE RIGHTS AND UNREFINED
PUBLIC POWER
BY JOHN T. MILLER, JR.-
In March, 1965, the Secretary of Commerce addressed a personal
appeal to 600 corporations,1 urging them to limit future foreign
investments in specified developed countries. Several "guidelines"
were suggested by which individual companies might improve their
balance of payment positions. Earlier in the same month, the Fed-
eral Reserve Board issued "guidelines" to banks and non-back fi-
nancial institutions requesting them to exercise self-restraint in
their foreign financial operations. 2 These actions were part of a
vigorous attempt to arrest a drain on the gold reserves of the United
States arising from an adverse balance of payments situation caused
in large measure by American foreign aid and military assistance
programs and the important demands of an affluent domestic
economy.
By the end of July, it was reported the commercial banks had
cooperated fully with the government's request, reducing their
foreign loans below the recommended 1965 target volume. Business
corporations had failed to comply. During the first six months of
1965 they invested $1.7 billion in foreign facilities, compared with
$2.4 billion for the entire year 1964.3 The government continued to
seek its objectives through "persuasion," but more direct and force-
ful action was indicated if voluntary procedures were not success-
ful.4
Whatever their intrinsic merit, these measures focus attention
on a subject which deserves more consideration and discussion than
it has so far obtained, namely, the status of American corpora-
* A.B., 1944, Clark University; LL.B., 1948, Georgetown University;
J.D., 1951, University of Geneva, Switzerland. Adjunct Professor of Law,
Georgetown University; member, District of Columbia and Connecticut
Bars.
1. Letter from the Sec'y of Commerce to 600 corporations, March 12,
1965.
2. See Federal Reserve Bd. Press Releases of March 3 and 5, 1965.
Banks with no previous foreign lending experience were positively dis-
couraged from making foreign loans in 1965. FRB Guideline (6) for com-
mercial banks.
3. The Washington Post, Sept. 26, 1965, § C, p. 13.
4. The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 7, 1965, p. 11. The federal govern-
ment can effectively enforce compliance under the authority granted under
12 U.S.C. § 95(a) (1952). See also, Pike v. United States, 340 F.2d 487
(9th Cir. 1965).
Summer 1966] PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC POWER 481
tions5 in foreign trade.'
Since World War II, the federal government has looked to
American corporations for effective assistance in carrying out pro-
grams designed to improve the living standards of people of other
countries, forestall the spread of communism, assure access to
essential raw materials needed for the American economy in peace
and in war, and to provide markets essential to maintaining the
high level of output of the American economy and the living stand-
ards enjoyed by the majority of its people. Encouragement to
expand exports and to invest abroad has taken many forms: loans,
credit and investment guarantees, grants, favorable tax legislation,
aid programs, trade fairs, business-finding activities of government
aides, treaties of trade, commerce and navigation, and a myriad of
intergovernmental accords and understandings.7
Foreign activities of American corporations have flourished
under this paternalistic sunshine. But growth has created new
problems and aggravated old ones, among them exposure to sub-
stantial injuries at the hands of foreign governments. Having
abandoned use of armed force as a device to protect American
foreign economic interests, the United States government has
sought through negotiation and exhortation to create an atmos-
phere favorable to private foreign investment abroad. When in-
juries to American investors have taken place, the American gov-
ernment has sought through diplomacy prompt, adequate and
effective compensation from the offending country. This has not
always forestalled injury or provided an adequate remedy. No
international tribunals has come into being to replace the discred-
ited arbitrament of force as a mode of assuring just treatment
from foreign governments.9 As a consequence, corporations have
5. Throughout this article, the term "American corporation" means
an investor-owner business corporation incorporated under the laws of the
United States, a State, Territory or the District of Columbia. Because of
space limitations, the banking industry will not be considered.
6. By "American foreign trade" is meant the export and import of
goods, services such as technology, and finance and all other manifestations
of a modern economy which require activities of American corporations
in foreign as opposed to interstate commerce.
7. Dillon, United States Foreign Trade and Investment Policies, in
LEGAL PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 107 (1959): Lewis, Doing Business
Abroad - The Role of Government in Facilitating Exports, 17 ARK. L. RaV.
454 (1964).
8. The international oil companies were disenchanted when the Inter-
national Court of Justice held it lacked jurisdiction to hear Great Britain's
charge against Iran arising out of the seizure by the latter of the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company. The Anglo-Iranian Case, I.C.J. #93 (1952). Now
these companies may have to deal with an association of nations. See
Middle East Oil on New Terms, The Economist, June 5, 1965, pp. 1151-68.
9. Compensation upon expropriation is but a bromide. As a business
corporation's raison d'etre is to be active in economic enterprises and not
to be a custodian of funds, it understandably fights to maintain the kind of
existence which allows it to freely operate its own business.
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been obliged to depend more and more upon their own resources
to protect their investments abroad.
The conflict of rights of governments and foreign investors
has led to interminable public discussions and a vast literature.'0
Largely overlooked is the growing need for definition of the com-
parative rights and obligations of the government of the United
States and of American corporations engaged in foreign trade. It
is the purpose of this article to examine the origins and nature of
this emerging problem.
THE NATURE AND SOURCE OF CORPORATE POWERS
With few exceptions," American corporations engaged in for-
eign trade are organized and operating under charters granted by
states and the District of Columbia.' 2 These charters determine
the nature and extent of corporate powers in the first instance.'
3
Modern charters create broad powers and provide little practical
restraint.' 4 Even when the specified powers are limited, there has
been a tendency for courts to decline to find corporate activities
ultra vires when challenged outside the state of incorporation.'
5
The United States Supreme Court long ago concluded that a
corporation has no existence, as a matter of right, outside of the
state which created it. Speaking for the Court in 1839, Mr. Chief
Justice Taney said:
It is very true that a corporation can have no legal existence
out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is cre-
ated. It exists only in contemplation of law and by force
of the law; and where that law ceases to operate, and is no
longer obligatory, the corporation can have no existence.
It must dwell in the place of its creation and cannot mi-
grate to another sovereignty.'0
10. E.g., WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1959); PLUMMER, INTERNATIONAL COMBINES IN MODERN INDUSTRY (3d ed.
1951).
11. National banks are chartered by the Controller of the Currency
under the National Bank Act of 1864, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 21 (1964).
Under the China Trade Act, 42 Stat. 849 (1922), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 141-62 (1964), a federal charter is issued by the Secretary of Commerce
for trade in China. Both President and Treasurer must be U.S. citizens
resident in Hong Kong or Taiwan.
12. However, these corporations may actually conduct some of their
operations abroad through subsidiaries or affiliates incorporated under the
laws of foreign countries. See Baker, Methods and Channels of Foreign
Trade, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 272 (1959); Moyer,
Operating a Corporate Enterprise Abroad, id. at 142.
13. Thus, if the corporate charter limited the corporation to intrastate
business, it could not lawfully engage in interstate or foreign commerce.
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587-88 (1839).
14. See Hawkland, Control of Foreign Corporate Activity by State of
Incorporation, 6 MIAMI L.Q. 41 (1951).
15. See FLETCHER, CYCOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8324 (1960).
16. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839).
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This holding is still the law; 17 but, it has proved no impediment to
the use of state charters by corporations engaged in American
interstate and foreign commerce. How could this be so?
Despite the fact that the bulk of American foreign trade and
investment is carried on by state-chartered corporations, their cre-
dentials to do business in foreign trade have not been challenged on
the legal ground that they originate with state governments. It
would seem that this is the result of several factors, deeply rooted
in our country's history.
CITIZEN'S RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN FOREIGN TRADE
Foreign trade was originally carried on by individuals in the
exercise of what they believed to be a basic right. In the course of
a legal opinion submitted to President Washington in 1791, Alexan-
der Hamilton, then Secretary of the Treasury, advised:
Every person, by the common law of each State, may ex-
port his property to foreign countries, at pleasure. But
Congress in pursuance of the power of regulating trade,
may prohibit the exportation of commodities; in doing
which, they would alter the common law of each state, in
abridgement of individual right.'
8
A similar view obtained in Great Britain. However, the exigen-
cies of foreign policy,19 the multiplicity of restrictive statutes in-
spired by a mercantilistic philosophy,20 and two centuries of ex-
perience in chartering joint-stock companies enjoying monopolies
in trade with foreign lands,21 so encrusted the right with state re-
strictions that its existence was often hard to perceive. In an opin-
ion given in 1718 to the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Planta-
tions on the question of whether the Crown could restrain English-
men establishing manufacturing facilities in France, counsel ad-
vised:
That particular subjects shall have an uncontrollable
liberty of all manner of trading, is not only against the
policy of our nation, but of all other governments whatso-
ever. I do, therefore, take it to be law, that the Crown may,
upon special occasion, and for reasons of state, restrain the
same; and that not only in cases of war, plague, or scarcity
of any commodity, of more necessary use at home, for the
provision of the subject, or the defense of the kingdom, etc.
(in which cases the King's prerogative is allowed to be be-
17. However, it has not gone unchallenged. See Crutcher v. Ken-
tucky, 141 U.S. 57 (1891).
18. 3 HAMILTON, WoRKs 460 (1904).
19. Embargoes on exports or requirements that a given commodity
be marketed through a specific foreign city are examples.
20. Some of these forbad the migration of skilled mechanics, or the
export of cloth-making machinery.
21. E.g., The Levant Co., East India Co., Muscovy Co., Hudson's Bay
Co. See generally Miller, The Corporation in International Affairs, 4
WORLD POLICY INSTITUTE (1966).
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yond dispute,) but even for the preservation of the balance
of trade: as, suppose a foreign prince, though in other re-
spects preserving a fair correspondence and in amity with
us, yet will not punctually observe such treaties of com-
merce as may have been made between the two nations; or,
in case there are no such treaties existing, refuses to enter
into such a regulation of trade as may be for the mutual ad-
vantage and benefit of both dominions: on such occasion, I
am of opinion that the King, by his prerogative, may pro-
hibit and restrain all his subjects in general, from exporting
particular commodities, etc.; or else, generally, from trading
to such a particular country or place; since trade does not
only depend upon the will or laws of the prince, whose
subjects adventure abroad to carry it on, but also of that
prince into whose country the commodities are exported,
and with whose subjects commerce is negotiated and con-
tracted; without such a power, it is obvious that the govern-
ment of England could not be upon equal terms with the
rest of its neighbors, and since trade depends principally
upon such treaties and alliances as are entered into by the
Crown with foreign princes; and, since the power of en-
tering into such treaties is vested absolutely in the Crown,
it necessarily follows that the management and direction of
trade, must, in a great measure, belong to the king.
22
Counsel went on to cite as precedent an earlier experience where,
upon a determination that the kingdom was being prejudiced by
the commercial activity, English authorities actually went to Russia
and destroyed tobacco machinery exported from England and op-
erated there by English workmen.
The American Revolution was fought to defend the rights of
Englishmen, rights which were considered natural and inviolable,
however ignored, abused or shackled in practice by the British
government. Blackstone had reasoned that these rights could be
reduced to three principal or primary articles: "the right of per-
sonal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of pri-
vate property. '23 Was the right to engage in foreign trade one of
these rights?
It is apparent that the founding fathers intended that the
rights of "property" safeguarded by the Constitution were not lim-
ited to tangible property already acquired, but included as well the
right to work for a living in the common occupations 24 and to ac-
22. See CHALMERS, OPINIONS OF EMINENT LAWYERS, 549-550 (1858).
23. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 129 (Tucker's ed. 1803). Almost
six centuries earlier, King John (1167-1216) agreed that such rights could
be expressed in these terms in Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta (1215):
No free man shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, outlawed, ban-
ished, or in any way destroyed, nor will we proceed against or
prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by
the law of the land.
24. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Truax v. Raith, 239
U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
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quire property; in other words, the right to trade, to manufacture
and to engage in commerce.25 But from the beginning, as Hamil-
ton observed, it was recognized that the right to engage in foreign
trade was subject to the lawful exercise by the federal government
of its powers.
A new tariff, an embargo, or a war, might bring upon in-
dividuals great losses; might, indeed, render valuable prop-
erty almost valueless,-might destroy the worth of con-
tracts. 'But whoever supposed' asked the Court, 'that, be-
cause of this a tariff could not be changed or a noninter-
course act, or embargo be enacted, or a war be declared.'
26
STATE CHARTERS MET BUSINESS NEEDS
Early state-chartered business corporations were small, man-
aged by their owners and engaged in domestic commerce.27 Their
operations were severely circumscribed; their charters strictly con-
strued against the grantees. 2s  Nonetheless, these corporations
proved so sensible and successful a form of business organization
that before 1850 most of the transportation, banking, insurance,
manufacturing and mining interests had passed into their hands.29
The corporations were active in interstate commerce.30 But it was
not until manufacturers constituted a substantial part of the foreign
exports of the United States after 1880 that corporations came to
play any significant role in trade with other countries.
3
1
25. See DUMBAULD, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDECE AND WHAT IT
MEANS TODAY 60-61 (1950).
In Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959), Chief Justice Warren
said ". . . the right to hold specific private employment and to follow a
chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental interference comes
within the 'liberty' and property concepts of the Fifth Amendment . .. .
U.S. CONST. amend. IX providing "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution
of certain Rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people." As yet, only the right to engage in political activity
has been recognized as coming under this amendment. See United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94 (1947).
26. Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 305 (1935).
27. For an excellent description of the evolution of corporate activi-
ties, particularly in New England, during the early part of the eighteenth
century, see DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESs CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 (1954).
28. See Beaty v. Knowles, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 152 (1830); Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 152 (1830).
29. 1 JOHNSON, HISTORY OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN COMMERCE IN THE
UNITED STATES 308 (1915).
30. Massachusetts corporations engaged in the manufacture of cotton
cloth purchased raw cotton and sold finished goods outside the state of
manufacture from the beginning of the nineteenth century. Daniel Webster
so advised the Supreme Court in his argument in Bank of Augusta v. Earle,
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 561 (1839). However, it was not until 1857 that
Massachusetts by statute authorized all locally chartered manufacturing
and mining corporations to carry on all or a part of their business beyond
the borders of the Commonwealth. DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORA-
TIONS UNTIL 1860 (1954).
31. Bureau of Statistics, U.S. Treasury Dep't, Exports of Manufactures
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After the Civil War, state-chartered corporations grew in size
and number. The largest of them, the so-called "trusts," played a
dominant role in the upward surge of exports of manufactures at
the end of the century.3 2 Although sometimes very large, these
nineteenth century corporations had few shareholders.3 3  It was
this identity of owners and managers which undoubtedly caused
Justice Bradley to observe:
To carry on interstate commerce is not a franchise or a
privilege granted by the state; it is a right which every
citizen of the United States is entitled to exercise under the
Constitution and laws of the United States; and the acces-
sion of mere corporate facilities, as a matter of convenience
in carrying on their business, cannot have the effect of de-
priving them of such right, unless Congress should see fit to
interpose some contrary regulation on the subject.
3 4
The corporations which play a vital role in American foreign
trade today are of quite a different character. Not only have
they become very much larger3 5 but divorcement of management
and ownership became the norm.3 6 Today one can not be sure at
any given moment, without considerable investigation, who owns or
controls the modern American corporations whose stock is traded
on the public exchanges. Ownership, control or management by
American citizens is never assured, and the future offers no imme-
diate clarification of this kaleidoscopic scene. The emerging role of
pension and investment funds as purchasers of common stocks
promises new eminences grises.
Recognition of a basic right in the citizen to engage in foreign
trade undoubtedly helped the corporation to become acceptable as
a device of business organization in foreign trade when laissez-faire
was the philosophy of the federal government. But no vested
rights were obtained thereby. As charters of the corporations en-
gaged in foreign trade did not come from the federal govern-
ment,3 7 no right of contract between corporations and government
would be violated by subsequent federal regulation. Nor did fed-
eral power weaken for lack of exercise during these years.
from the United States, 1790-1902, Monthly Summary of Commerce and
Finance of the United States 3242, 3245 (April 1903).
32. 2 JOHNSON, op. cit. supra note 29, at 134.
33. Six persons owned and controlled The American Tobacco Com-
pany, organized in 1904 and capitalized at $180 million. See United States
v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 173 (1811). The Standard Oil
"Trust" was similarly in the hands of a few persons. Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
34. Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 57 (1891).
35. See Companies Outgrow Countries, The Economist, October 17,
1964, p. 271.
36. Vividly publicized for the first time in the classic study by BERLE
& MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
37. Cf., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819).
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Why then did businessmen rely upon state charters for their
foreign trade activities? State charters met the observed needs of
the business community. There has been no real demand for fed-
eral charters. Let us take up this latter point first.
No APPARENT BUSINESS NEED FOR FEDERAL CHARTERS
American foreign trade came to be dominated by state-char-
tered private corporations both by design and default. Although
delegated exclusive power to regulate foreign commerce, the federal
government declined the role of provender of corporate charters to
private enterprises wishing to engage in foreign trade.
The Constitution of the United States does not contain a spe-
cific grant of power to Congress to charter private corporations.
Within a few years of its adoption, the draftsmen were quarreling
over whether the federal government had such a power. 38 During
the Constitutional Convention of 1787, James Madison submitted a
list of powers, to be added to those of the General Legislature,
which included the power "to grant charters of incorporation in
cases where the Public good may require them, and the authority
of a single State may be incompetent. '39 Apparently the recom-
mendation died in committee.
On September 14, 1787, in the course of consideration of the
text of article I, section 8, prepared by the Committee of "Stile &
arrangement," Madison attempted to insert his recommendation
into the Constitution by enlarging a motion made by Benjamin
Franklin relating to the grant of power to build canals. Madison's
journal summarizes his own argument:
His primary object was however to secure an easy commu-
nication between the States which the free intercourse now
to be opened, seemed to call for-The political obstacles be-
ing removed, a removal of the natural ones as far as possible
ought to follow.
Edmund Randolph of Virginia seconded the proposal. Madison's
notes of the ensuing debate show the temper of the times. Rufus
King of Massachusetts opposed on the ground that the power was
unnecessary, would arouse opposition in the states, and might be
viewed in terms of the establishment of a bank or mercantile
monopoly. Mason of Virginia would have limited the power to
canals, fearing molopolies of every sort.40 James Wilson of Penn-
38. A similar problem arose under the Articles of Confederation. In
1781 the Bank of North America was chartered by Congress. Three states,
including Pennsylvania, enacted auxiliary charters to assure the bank's
right to do business. The directors of the bank took out a Delaware charter
to protect the bank when Pennsylvania repealed its incorporating statute.
See Davis, Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations, No. IV,
in EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BUSINESS CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
10-12, 30 (1917).
39. 4 MADISON, WRITINGS 229 (Hunt ed. 1903).
40. This fear of monopolies was not unreasonable. It reflected the
experience of the colonists at the hands of the great corporations chartered
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sylvania considered the power necessary to prevent a state from
obstructing the general welfare: "As to mercantile monopolies they
are already included in the power to regulate trade." Madison's
motion was rejected eight votes to three.41 So ended the record of
debates on the power to charter corporations.
Congress enacted a statute in 1791 establishing the Bank of the
United States.42  Before signing the bill, President Washington
asked Secretary of State Jefferson, Attorney-General Randolph, and
Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton to advise him as to the legality
of a federal charter for such a corporation. 43 Jefferson and Ran-
dolph replied in the negative. Jefferson asserted that the debates
in the convention and the vote against Madison's motion required
the conclusion that the power to charter corporations had been de-
nied. "It is known that the very power now proposed as a means
was rejected as an end by the Convention which formed the Con-
stitution."44
Hamilton justified the constitutionality of the legislation by re-
liance upon a doctrine of implied powers: Congress has the power to
do all things reasonably necessary to carry out the powers spe-
cifically granted by the Constitution. In those areas in which the
federal government, by virtue of the grant of specific power, is
supreme, it enjoys sovereignty; and, one of the attributes of sover-
eignty is the power to charter corporations. A corporation should
be considered, therefore, only as a means of carrying out a specific
power set forth in the Constitution. As for the action of the Con-
stitutional Convention in denying Madison's proposal, Hamilton
concluded that this proved nothing one way or the other. The
precise nature or extent of the proposal or the reasons for refusing
it could not be ascertained from any authentic document or ac-
curate recollection. 45 The bill became law.
Twenty-eight years later the Supreme Court adopted Hamil-
ton's arguments in upholding the charter of the second Bank of the
United States.46 Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court,
by the Crown. See 2 DAVIS, CORPORATIONS, Ch. III-VI (Capricorn ed. 1961).
Pitt once observed that it was not true that commercial companies could
not govern empires; the East India Company had done just that for many
years. See AUBER, AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITIUTION OF THE EAST INDIAN
COMPANY 79 (1826).
41. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1787-1870) 744-45.
42. 1 Stat. § 3 (1861).
43. Each of these gentlemen had participated in the Constitutional
Convention, although all probably were not present during the debates
on September 18, 1789.
44. 3 JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 149 (Bergh ed.). (Emphasis added.)
45. 3 HAMILTON, WORKS 462 (federal ed. 1904).
46. The charter of the first Bank of the United States expired by its
terms in 1811. The second Bank was chartered in 1816. Whatever scruples
Madison might have had during the Constitutional Convention as to the
power of the Congress to charter corporations were by now laid to rest.
He signed the charter of the new bank.
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intoned:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.
That a corporation must be considered as a means not
less usual, not of higher dignity, not more requiring a par-
ticular specification than other means, has been sufficiently
proved. If we look to the origin of corporations, to the
manner in which they have been framed in that govern-
ment from which we have derived most of our legal princi-
ples and ideas, or to the uses to which they have been ap-
plied, we find no reason to suppose that a constitution,
omitting, and wisely omitting, to enumerate all the means
for carrying into execution the great powers vested in gov-
ernment, ought to have specified this. Had it been intend-
ed to grant this power as one which should be distinct and
independent, to be exercised in any case whatever, it would
have found a place among the enumerated powers of the
government. But being considered merely as a means, to
be employed only for the purpose of carrying into execution
the given powers, there could be no motive for particularly
mentioning it.
47
The question of the power of the federal government to charter
corporations was thus laid to rest, never thereafter to be effectively
challenged in the courts. But it was a Pyrrhic victory. President
Jackson continued his vendetta against the Bank. Its charter
expired and was not renewed.
Congress became reluctant to charter any new business cor-
poration. Thereafter, applicants would have to demonstrate a di-
rect relationship between the act of incorporation and the power
granted Congress under the Constitution. And Congress would
have to be persuaded that a corporation chartered by the federal
government was a necessary means of achieving the objective.
48
Congress did issue some business corporation charters during
the remainder of the nineteenth century. Banks were the principal
beneficiaries; some of the charters obviously designed to meet the
particular needs of the District of Columbia.
Communications also attracted the attention of Congress. A
few interstate bridge corporations Were chartered. 49 In 1862, with
the encouragement of President Lincoln, Congress chartered the
Union Pacific Railroad Company to build a transcontinental rail-
road from the Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean and to secure to
the government the "use of the same for Postal, Military and Other
47. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411, 421 (1819).
48. See Davis, Essays on the Earlier History of American Corporations,
No. IV, in EIGHTNTH CENTURY BusiNEss CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 15-16 (1917).
49. See Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525 (1894).
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Purposes."5 0 Other interstate railroad company charters followed,
their legality upheld by the Supreme Court.51
In the present century, the federal government has frequently
found it desirable to charter corporations to engage in activities of
a business nature, principally during wars and economic crises.
52
Few, if any, were privately-owned. While the charters sometimes
were drawn to permit private participation, they usually resulted
in ownership and control by the federal government.
5
3
It is interesting to observe that state-chartered corporations
had become so well accepted as the modus operandi of the busi-
ness world, that the federal government itself applied for and was
issued charters by State governments.54 Corporations owned and
controlled by the federal government were chartered under the laws
of the States of Alabama, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New
York, Tennessee, Washington, the District of Columbia and the
Virgin Islands. 55 An unhappy Congress brought a stop to this prac-
tice in 1945, ordering all such state-chartered corporations to be
wound up by 1948 and forbidding the organization of further cor-
porations by the federal government except pursuant to Act of
Congress.
56
The twentieth century has also witnessed sporadic efforts to
introduce federal charters into the private business world, but with-
out success. The Commissioner of Corporations under President
Theodore Roosevelt recommended to Congress the enactment of a
system of federal licensing as a device to regulate private corpora-
tions engaged in interstate commerce.5 7 This was at a time when a
growing concern over "trusts" and monopolies brought about a re-
50. 12 Stat. 489 (1862).
51. See Pacific R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885); California v.
Pacific R.R., 127 U.S. 1 (1888).
52. Seven corporations were established to help prosecute World War
I. Banking and credit institutions were founded under the Federal Reserve
Act of 1913, the Farm Loan Act of 1916, Agricultural Credits Act of 1923,
Home Loan Act of 1932 and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1932. By
1944 there were 40 corporations operating under the supervision of govern-
ment agencies and four independent government corporations (TVA, TVA
Assoc. Coops. Inc., FDIC, and Panama Railroad Company). See Reduction
on Nonessential Federal Expenditures: Government Corporations, Addi-
tional Report of the Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal
Expenditures, S. Doc. No. 227, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) 1-2, 24.
53. See Sloan Shipyards v. United States Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549,
565 (1922).
54. Reasons why the federal government should charter its corpora-
tions under state law were found difficult to understand. See Reduction
of Nonessential Federal Expenditures: Government Corporations, op. cit.
supra note 52, at 27.
55. Id. at 26.
56. Government Corporation Control Act, 31 U.S.C. § 869 (1964).
57. Report of the Commissioner of Corporations, H.R. Doc. No. 165,
58th Cong., 3d Sess. 47 (1904).
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vival of the Sherman Act.58  In his report, the Commissioner
concluded:
[Compulsory federal incorporation] is probably legally
practicable, but it involves radical industrial and political
changes by the centralization of power in the Federal Gov-
ernment, and presents serious difficulties because of its ef-
fect upon the authority of the States over such corpora-
tions in matters of taxation and local regulation. Any op-
tional law of this character would not overcome these dif-
ficulties.59
In 1910 President Taft recommended a permissive federal incor-
poration bill,60 as did President Wilson after him.6 1 Neither was
successful.
There was so little interest in requiring federal charters for
business corporations that when Congress in 1918 provided for
exemption from the Sherman Act of associations "entered into for
the sole purpose of engaging in export trade, '6 2 it did not require or
even suggest federal charters for the corporations which would
enjoy the benefits of the statute.
Interest in federal licensing was rekindled in the 1930's by
Senators Borah and O'Mahoney in an effort to restrain the econom-
ic power of the large state-chartered corporations, and has been
renewed from time to time, 3 always without success. 64 Congress
has failed to enact compulsory federal incorporation legislation not
because it lacks the power but because neither Congress nor the
business community was persuaded of the need.6 5 The late Senator
58. President Roosevelt's energetic actions resulted in landmark
antitrust decisions in Northern Securities Co. v United States, 193 U.S.
197 (1904); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106 (1911). In the
process, the Supreme Court overturned its decision in United States v.
E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895), it declined to break up the Sugar Trust,
holding that production and manufacturing were not commerce within the
meaning of the Sherman Act.
59. Report of the Commissioner of Corporations, op. cit. supra note 57.
60. For a discussion of alleged constitutional issues raised by this
proposal, see HEISLER, FEDERAL INCORPORATION, CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
INVOLVED (1913).
61. Utility Corporations, Compilation of Proposals and Views for and
Against Federal Incorporation or Licensing of Corporations etc., S. Doc. No.
92, 17, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928).
62. Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
Proposals for the statute followed publication in 1916 by the then very new
Federal Trade Commission of its two volume report entitled COOPERATIO14
IN AMERICAN EXPORT TRADE.
63. The Temporary National Economic Committee recommended in
its final report in 1941 that Congress enact legislation setting up "national
standards for national corporations." See Final Report and Recommenda-
tions of the Temporary Economic Committee, S. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. 29 (1941).
64. REUScHLEIN, THE SCHOOLS Or CORPORATE REFORM 43 (1950); 1
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2.3 (1960).
65. This judgment is based upon the small number of private business
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O'Mahoney viewed the problem in these terms:
Thus the paradox pursues us. Its most striking aspect in
our time is to be found in the fact that, although no serious
argument is made against the all-inclusive nature of the
power of Congress to regulate commerce, the Congress still
clings to the dead past by refusing to take the necessary
step to define the powers and responsibilities of the cor-
porate agencies which carry on the commerce everybody
recognizes Congress has the power to regulate. Because it
has failed to define these powers and responsibilities it has
surrendered a substantial part of its inherent power to pri-
vate monopolies which have been growing apace under
charters issued by the states; charters which create gigantic
corporate units to operate in the very field of national and
international commerce, jurisdiction over which was spe-
cifically taken from the states .... 66
Antitrust laws, securities controls, and other remedial legisla-
tion have curbed the most patent abuses of private corporations
in interstate trade. In foreign trade, where the corporations are
shepherded by the same laws, a more significant factor is present.
The President has vast powers in foreign affairs, their limits only
partly defined by legislation. While the ultimate tests of legality
of Presidential acts are to be applied by the courts, we cannot ex-
pect to receive definitive guidance from that quarter.67 State-
chartered corporations have not been treated as trespassers in
American foreign trade. Their role in foreign commerce over a
period of 150 years has been recognized by burgeoning federal
statutes and regulations, and protected by treaties.
SOURCE OF FEDERAL POWER OVER FOREIGN TRADE
Congress is given exclusive power under the Constitution to
regulate commerce with foreign nations.6 The conduct of for-
eign affairs, imposition of tariffs, national defense, the waging of
war, banking and currency and many other functions of the fed-
eral government provide a very broad basis for the powers of the
corporation charters granted by Congress over the past 150 years. See
FENNELL, CORPORATIONS CHARTERED BY SPECIAL ACT OF CONGRESS (rev. ed.
1958).
66. O'Mahoney, Federal Charters to Save Free Enterprise, 1949 Wis.
L. Rv. 407, 408-9.
67. The following observation by Mr. Justice Frankfurter is still apt:
The history of American constitutional law in no small measure
is the history of the impact of the modern corporation upon the
American scene. We are still sadly awaiting a comprehensive ac-
count of the pervasive influence of corporate enterprise upon our
national life, and its judicial aspect is only very partially written
in the opinions dealing with constitutional protections claimed for
incorporated business.
FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WArrE
63 (1937).
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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President and of Congress in foreign trade and international af-
fairs.69 The Supreme Court has held that many of these powers of
the federal government are inherent attributes of sovereignty:
[T] he investment of the federal government with the power
of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirma-
tive grants of the Constitution. The power to declare and
wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain
diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had
never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vest-
ed in the Federal Government as necessary concomitants
of nationality.
7°
The sovereign creating a corporation has visitorial powers over it,
the power to assure itself that the corporation which is its creature
is not abusing the charter.71 The powers of the courts might be
utilized, through writs of quo warranto and mandamus, to police
the corporation's activities. The charter can be withdrawn.
The federal government has such powers as to the corpora-
tions it charters by virtue of the fact that it is the source of the
corporation's existence and powers.7 2 While declining to hold that
the federal government has a general visitorial power over state
corporations, the Supreme Court has held that as to interstate
commerce it had "in vindication of its own laws, the same power it
would possess if the corporation had been created by act of Con-
gress."
73
As an adjunct of its vast power over foreign affairs, the federal
government has the power to investigate corporate activities. In
the exercise of this power, Congress gave the Federal Trade Com-
mission authority
To investigate, from time to time, trade conditions in and
with foreign countries where associations, combinations, or
practices of manufacturers, merchants, or traders, or other
conditions, may affect the foreign trade of the United
69. The verdict of history, in short, is that the power to deter-
mine the substantive content of American foreign policy is a di-
vided power, with the lion's share falling usually, though by no
means always, to the President.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, 171 (1957).
The courts avoid enquiry into "political questions" arising in foreign
affairs. Foster v. Neilson, 29 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); C & S Airlines v.
Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
70. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
71. See State ex rel. Cuppel v. The Chamber of Commerce of Mil-
waukee, 47 Wis. 670, 679-80, 3 N.W. 760, 763-64 (1879).
72. In United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569 (1878), the Court
noted:
The company is organized under, and owes its corporate existence
to, an act of Congress. The government has all the rights which
belong to any other government as a sovereign and legislative
power over this creation of that power ....
Id. at 613.
73. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224
U.S. 194, 215, citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75 (1906).
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States, and to report to Congress thereon, with such recom-
mendations as it deems advisable.
7 4
The investigative power is frequently exercised also through the
vehicle of congressional hearings. The principle, however, has not
yet been accepted that the federal government through the execu-
tive branch may monitor corporate activities, in the absence of
specific enabling legislation, to ensure that the corporate activities
are consistent with and support foreign policy. The power to do
just that exists, but as yet it is largely unused. Persuasion,
rather than compulsion is still deemed preferable. 6 Ample scope
for individual initiative and decisions inconsistent with the gov-
ernment's foreign policy are allowed. A centrally planned foreign
policy program completely coordinating the public and private sec-
tors has not yet been accomplished.
The President is invested by the Constitution with broad po-
litical powers "in the exercise of which he is to use his own discre-
tion, and is accountable only to his country in his political charac-
ter, and to his own conscience. '76 Does this mean that he is
above the law? The Supreme Court has held: "The prohibitions of
the Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the na-
tional government and they cannot be nullified by the Executive
or [in a treaty] by the Executive and the Senate combined."77 It
may be added, however, that the courts have been reluctant to
enjoin the President in the performance of his duties or to hold
his actions unlawful.
7 8
74. 15 U.S.C. § 46(h) (1952); see Kronstein, Reporting on Corporate
Activity 38 U. DET. L.J. 589 (1961).
75. We have a plan to get together, with these key countries, rep-
resentative groups of American businessmen of the kind that you
find in the ordinary chamber of commerce and try to be persua-
sive with them that it is in their longrun, self-interest to behave
in a very responsible fashion as far as these countries are con-
cerned. We will thus use our power of persuasion plus our power
to make laws, investment guarantees, and things of that kind.
These are the two things we are trying to do about it, because
those, as I see it, are about the only two areas in which we can
really be effective, since we do not have any legislative power to
require.
Testimony of Mr. Fowler Hamilton, Administrator, Agency for International
Development, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, Hearings before the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations on S.2996, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 113-114 (1962).
76. Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.)
165 (1803).
77. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 66 (1957).
78. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
Cf. Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), where it was held that
the President's seizure of the steel mills of the country to avert a nation-
wide strike might be enjoined because it involved an attempted exercise
of the law-making power vested in Congress. Zinn, Extent of the Control
of the Executive by the Congress of the United States, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1960), Committee Print, for use of the Committee on Government Oper-
ations (1962).
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FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS
In interstate and foreign commerce, states may not permit what
the federal government forbids.79 Consequently, neither a provi-
sion in a corporate charter granted by a state nor state corporation
law may sanction business activities outlawed by Congress. In
Northern Securities Co. v. United States,80 suit was brought by the
Attorney General under the anti-monopoly provision of the Sher-
man Act s ' to enjoin a New Jersey corporation from holding the
shares of two competing interstate railroads serving the far west.
The defendant insisted that its actions were lawful because they
enjoyed the sanction of the law of the State of New Jersey which
granted its charter. The Supreme Court rejected this conten-
tion:
So far as the constitution of the United States is concerned,
a state may, indeed, create a corporation, define its powers,
prescribe the amount of its stock and the mode in which it
may be transferred. It may even authorize one of its cor-
porations to engage in commerce of every kind; domestic,
interstate and international. . . . But neither a state cor-
poration or its stockholders can, by reason of the non-action
of the state or by means of any combination amongst such
stockholders, interfere with the complete enforcement of
any rule lawfully devised by Congress for the conduct of
commerce among the states or with foreign nations; for, as
we have seen, interstate and international commerce is by
the constitution under the control of Congress, and it be-
longs to the legislative department of the government to
prescribe rules for the conduct of that commerce. . . . So
long as Congress keeps within the limits of its authority as
defined by the constitution, infringing no rights recognized
or secured by that instrument, its regulations of interstate
and international commerce, whether founded in wisdom or
not, must be submitted to by all.
82
The power of Congress over foreign trade is very broad.8 3
Whether carried on by individuals or by corporations,8 4 Congress
may free foreign commerce from any encumbrance; or it can en-
courage, regulate, tax, restrain or even prohibit it.8 5 While Con-
79. "The power to regulate commerce among the several States was
granted to Congress in terms as absolute as the power to regulate com-
merce with the foreign nations." Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U.S.
577, 587 (1895). See also United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 147-48 (1938).
80. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
81. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
82. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. at 347.
83. However, it may not delegate its regulatory power to a state or
state agency. See Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. Federal Power Comm.,
124 F.2d 800, 807 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied 313 U.S. 546 (1940).
84. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 182 (1869).
85. Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933). See also,
STORY, CONSTITUTION § 1076 (5th ed by Bigelow 1891) which states:
Many of the like powers have been applied in the regulation of
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gress has the power to preclude the states from any role whatsoever
in foreign commerce, it has not chosen as yet to do so. So long as
this federal power remains unexercised, the state-chartered cor-
porations may play their roles,8 6 though they exist in foreign trade
by sufferance of the federal government.
Federal regulation of state-chartered corporations in foreign
trade usually takes the form of encouragement or discourage-
ment of certain types of activities.8 7 It is assumed that the cor-
poration can engage in foreign trade under its charter.88 The Sher-
man Anti-trust Act of 1890, for example, designed to free interstate
and foreign commerce from the impediments of unlawful monopo-
lies and restraints of trade, was made applicable to "corporations
and associations existing under and authorized by the laws of
either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the
laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country."8 9 As early
as 1911, the Supreme Court enforced this statute by ordering both
English and state-chartered American corporations to abrogate their
agreement confining themselves to their respective domestic mar-
kets.9 0 Teeth were added to the order dissolving the monopoly by
a provision that if the order was not complied with "it shall be the
duty of the court, either by way of an injunction restraining the
movement of the products of the combination in the channels of
interstate or foreign commerce or by the appointment of a re-
ceiver, to give effect to the requirements of the statute."91
foreign commerce. The commercial system of the United States
has also been employed for the purpose of revenue; sometimes for
the purpose of prohibition; sometimes for the purpose of retal-
iation and commercial reciprocity; sometimes to lay embargoes;
sometimes to encourage domestic navigation, and . . . shipping....
In all of these cases, the right and duty have been conceded to the
national government by the unequivocal voice of the people.
86. However, the Supreme Court has seldom upheld state regulation
of foreign trade. See Henderson v. New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876). My
conclusion here is based on the practical necessities of the situation, a
standard recognized by the Court in some cases where state regulations
have affected interstate commerce. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,
325 U.S. 761, 766-67 (1945); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
87. As where it encouraged the development of the foreign routes of
American airlines. See Pan American World Airways v. United States,
371 U.S. 276. N.3 (1963).
88. It would not appear necessary to seek the justification of this rec-
ognition in any "real" as opposed to "fiction" theory of the nature of a
corporation. For a description of various such theories see Wolff, On the
Nature of Legal Persons, 54 L. Q. REV. 494 (1938).
89. § 8, 26 Stat. 210 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
90. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). For
a recital of American experience in applying the federal antitrust laws to
international trade, see BREWSTER, ANTI-TRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD (1958); FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND TE ANTI-TRUST LAWS
(1960); KRONSTEIN, MILLER & DOMMER, MAJOR AMERICAN ANTI-TRUST LAWS
ch. 12 (1965).
91. United States v. American Tobocco Co., 221 U.S. at 188. (Em-
phasis added).
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Competing corporations desiring to work together to develop
foreign trade can enjoy a limited exemption from the antitrust
laws if they carry on the business through an association submitted
to the superintentendence of the Federal Trade Commission." The
statute is silent as to the source of the charters of the corporations
entitled to enjoy the benefits of this statute. As a consequence,
state-chartered corporations enjoy the privilege.
Ocean shipping companies must file their agreements affecting
rates, terms and conditions with the Federal Maritime Commission
which may, after hearing, modify them to bring them into line
with criteria adopted by Congress.9 3 Air fares relating to foreign
flight, arrived at under the aegis of the International Air Transport
Organization are overseen by the Civil Aeronautics Board. The
export of natural gas0 4 and of electric power95 by corporations is
regulated by statutes. But none of these laws makes any reference
to the source of the corporation's charter.
Armaments, including technology relating thereto, can be ex-
ported, if at all, by corporations only upon compliance with the In-
ternational Traffic in Arms regulations of the Department of
State,96 the patent regulations of the Commissioner of Patents9 7
and applicable Defense Department security regulations.98 The
Department of Commerce has a vast number of regulation ap-
plicable to corporations governing other areas of exports.9 0 All of
these regulations apply to state-chartered corporations.
Certain areas of the world-notably the communist countries
-are made off-limits to all American corporations unless specific
government assent is obtained, 100 a modern kin of the embargo im-
posed in 1807 under President Jefferson. 1 1 Currency and securi-
ties controls, ebbing and flowing with the demands of war and peace,
are applicable to every American corporation.
10 2
92. A function created by the Webb-Pomerene Act, 40 Stat. 516
(1918), 15 U.S.C. §§ 861-65 (1964). As to the limited character of the
exemption, see United States v. United States Alkali Export Association,
86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
93. 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(5) (1952).
94. Natural Gas Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 171b (1964).
95. Federal Power Act § 202(e), 16 U.S.C. § 824a (1964).
96. See 22 C.F.R. § 121 (1958).
97. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 5, 181-188 (1964). See also 37 C.F.R. §§ 5.1-5.23
(1960).
98. See Ansell & Hamilton, Security Considerations in Filing Patents
Abroad, 50 A.B.A.J. 946 (1964).
99. Export Control Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2032 (1964). See
the regulations under this act in 15 C.F.R. § 385 (1965).
100. E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT EXPORT BULL. No. 891
(1964).
101. 1 MORRISON & COMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUB-
LIc 394 (1962).
102. 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) (1964).
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CONTROL OVER FOREIGN TRADE BY TREATY
Treaties, to the extent that they refer to the subject, are de-
signed to protect American corporations engaged in foreign trade
against unlawful injury at the hands of other countries, and Amer-
ican corporations owned by nationals of the co-contracting state
against discrimination by the United States Government. They
also serve to facilitate corporate activities in international trade.
0 3
The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the
United States and Netherlands, signed at The Hague on March 27,
1956,104 defines and safeguards the rights of "companies of either
Party." Article XXIII, paragraph 3, states: "Companies consti-
tuted under the applicable laws and regulations within the terri-
tories of either Party shall be deemed companies thereof and shall
have their juridical status recognized within the territories of the
other Party." This sophisticated language, found in a number of
treaties executed since World War 11,105 effectively cloaks the fact
that it is states and not the United States Government which char-
ter the American corporations it is protecting.
Treaties entered into earlier in this century gave more precise
recognition of the origins of corporate charters. For example, the
1927 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and of Consular Rights be-
tween the United States and Honduras, refers to corporations
"which have been or may hereafter be organized in accordance
with and under the laws, national, State, or Provincial, of either
High Contracting Party and maintain a central office within the
territories thereof.'
0 6
Commercial treaties entered into a century or more ago, and
still effective, reflect the small part then played by corporations in
American foreign trade. Treaty provisions speak of the rights of
"American citizens" or "citizens of the United States"; 10 7 protection
sought against discriminatory duties on the "growth produce or
manufacture" of the United States.1 08 There is no reference to cor-
porations as such.
Of course, the fact that a corporation is chartered in the United
States does not guarantee treaty protection. The 1951 Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States
103. See WILSON, UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1960); Haight, Restrictive Business Practice Clauses in
United States Treaties: An Anti-trust Tranquilizer for International Trade,
70 YALE L. J. 240 (1960).
104. T.I.A.S. No. 3942.
105. Similar language is used in other recent treaties. See Ireland,
Japan, Korea, Nicaragua, Israel, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany,
T.I.A.S. No. 2155, 2863, 3947, 4024, 2948, 4797 and 3593.
106. T.C. No. 764, art. VIII. (Emphasis supplied.)
107. Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the United States and
Muscat, 1833 T.S. No. 247.
108. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the United
States and Paraguay, 1859, T.S. No. 272.
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and Greece specifically provides that each country may deny the
advantages of the treaty, except juridical status and appearance in
court, to any company "even though it may have the nationality of
the other Party, as long as ownership or direction of the company is
controlled by nationals or companies of a third country.' u0 9
The United States has at times recognized such a distinction in
cases involving American corporations. The assistance of the Uni-
ted States in obtaining redress against another country has been
refused where it was found that the ownership and control of the
American corporation were in the hands of aliens." 0 On the other
hand, a California corporation wholly-owned by a Japanese cor-
poration was held by American courts to lack standing to invoke a
treaty with Japan as a defense against a federal antitrust suit."'
These treaties do not guarantee any person-national or alien-
the right to engage in American foreign trade, whether as an
individual or through the vehicle of a corporation. "National
treatment" and "most-favored nation treatment" may be assured.
1 12
Nonetheless, the American government may, and sometimes does,
require that corporations engaged in certain types of activities,
such as ocean shipping," 3 telecommunications," 4 and aircraft pro-
duction essential to national defense" 5 be owned and controlled
by nationals.
By virtue of the expressly or impliedly reserved right to enact
legislation concerning national defense 1 6 or foreign trade,"7 the
government has considerable power to affect corporate activity.
Such actions may be discriminatory yet still lawful, so long as they
do not fall below international laws standards of procedural and
substantive due process.""
FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICT CANNOT BE RESOLVED BY "COMITY"
Federal courts have recognized the factual existence of corpora-
109. Art. XXIII, para. 1 (f), T.I.A.S. 3057.
110. See 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 839 (1943).
111. United States v. R. P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818 (D. Cal.
1957).
112. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 1954 art. V, para. 5, T.I.A.S.
No. 3593.
113. See RIENOW, THE TEST OF NATIONALITY OF A MERCHANT SHIP
(1937). For regulation of American cabotage, see 46 U.S.C. § 221 (1964).
114. 47 U.S.C. §§ 222(d), 310; 48 U.S.C. § 302a (1964).
115. 10 U.S.C. § 310(j) (1964).
116. It has become customary in wartime to seize national corpora-
tions controlled directly or indirectly by enemy nationals. See Clark v.
Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, A.G., 332 U.S. 480 (1947).
117. Under American constitutional law, treaties give way to subse-
quent federal legislation. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884).
118. See Delagoa Bay Arbitration (McMurdo [U.S.] v. Portugal),
MOORE, 2 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 1865-1899. See also Christie, What
Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law, 38 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 307 (1902).
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tions chartered outside the United States on the basis of comity
since the last century, 119 apparently allowing them a status in inter-
state commerce more favorable than that enjoyed by state-chart-
ered corporations subject to discretionary recognition in other
states.120 Comity implies a practical need for reciprocity of recog-
nition, a state of affairs which exists between nations, and between
states within the United States. It does not exist, however, be-
tween the federal and state governments.
Corporations chartered by the federal government may operate
anywhere within the United States without the consent-and even
contrary to the wishes-of affected states.' 2 1 By contrast, the pow-
ers of state-chartered corporations must give way to federal laws
and regulations. As the federal government is not dependent on
the states as the source of charters for corporations engaged in
foreign trade, neither equality nor interdependence would require
any branch of the federal government to recognize state-chartered
corporations in foreign trade on the basis of a rule of comity.
BUSINESS BY SUFFERANCE
Although the federal government has by passive consent per-
mitted the conduct of foreign trade by state-chartered corporations
for more than a century,122 no prescriptive rights can be thus ac-
quired which cannot be curtailed or denied by later act of Congress
or action of the President. As previously noted, the federal courts
have on rare occasions upheld state laws and regulations affecting
foreign commerce, 23 but not in the face of federal legislation pre-
empting the field, 124 nor where such laws and regulations constitute
an undue burden on such trade. 25 Corporate charters can claim no
greater respect from the federal government than other state laws
or regulations command.
It has been observed that the "Constitution does not guarantee
the unrestricted privilege to engage in a business or to conduct it as
119. The Liverpool and London Fire and Life Assn. Co. v. Massachu-
setts, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 566 (1870).
120. FARNSWORTH, RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE OF CORPORATIONS 65
(1939).
121. See Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Co., 314 U.S; 95 (1941).
This does not' mean that the states may not under some circumstances
regulate such a corporation, Reagan v. Mercantile Trust Co., 154 U.S. 413
(1894) or tax them, Thomson v. Pacific Railroad, U.S. (9 Wall.) 579, 588
(1870).
122. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 589 (1839).
123. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 443-444 (1827);
Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 21 (1900).
124. See Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
125. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) the Supreme
Court invalidated a state-granted monopoly to operate steamboats in New
York State's "foreign" trade. See also United States v. Carolene Products,
304 U.S. 144, 147-148 (1938).
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one pleases. 1 26 Viewed in terms of government power to regulate,
no one has or can have a vested interest to engage in foreign trade
in any particular manner. 12 The Supreme Court made this per-
fectly clear when it upheld federal legislation wiping out the "gold
clauses" in contracts between American and foreign persons.
12'
An analogy in the interstate domain may clarify the law on the
problem. A corporation receiving or hoping to obtain an economic
benefit from riparian property on an interstate waterway cannot
obtain a private property right in the flow of the stream. 29 It is
entitled to no compensation if it loses access to navigable waters
should the government change the course of the stream to im-
prove navigation.1 30  The federal government enjoys a servitude
which it may exercise to improve the stream's navigability' 31 and,
though it may frustrate a private enterprise, such activity is not a
taking of property."
2
Hydroelectric dams built with State approval may be ordered
destroyed if the private owner neglects to obtain a federal license
required by a statute enacted by Congress. 13 3  Reaches of the
river may be reserved for multiple development-generation by
hydroelectric power, flood control and navigation-by a federal
agency, as in the case of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of
1933,"1 although the river valley had been utilized by private
persons for more than a century and a half prior to the legislation.
And the federal government may even use these waterways to com-
pete with long-existing private enterprise in the wholesale and re-
tail of electricity, an injury deemed damnum abseque injuria by
the courts. 5 Of course, there are instances where private per-
sons may be entitled to recover damages from the federal govern-
ment, where it has exercised its power over such waterways, by
virtue of the fifth amendment safeguards against deprivation of
property for public use without just compensation," 3 6 or by the
provisions of specific statutes. 13 7
126. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 527-528 (1934).
127. See Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1933).
128. Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
129. United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 427 (1940).
130. United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945). The
destruction of oyster beds resulting from the dredging of a navigable chan-
nel has been held not to be a constitutional taking. Lewis Blue Point
Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913).
131. See Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271-72 (1897).
132. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
133. Section 23(b) of the Federal Power Act makes it unlawful to
construct such facilities. 16 U.S.C. § 817 (1964).
134. 48 Stat. 58(c), 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1964).
135. Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
136. As where the government floods land by erecting dams. United
States v. Lynch, 188 U.S. 445 (1903).
137. The federal government may, for example, "take over" hydro-
electric projects licensed by the Federal Power Commission, upon expira-
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The inadequacy of this analogy is readily apparent. Con-
gress and the President exercise powers in foreign and interna-
tional trade 13 which are materially broader than those utilized on
the domestic scene. Moreover, opportunities to injure American
corporations engaged in that trade are rapidly multiplying.
REDRESS AGAINST INJURY CAUSED BY THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
Injury to an American firm at the hands of its own government
may be swift, unforeseen, complete and irremedial; and, redress
may be limited in nature and manner. For example, American
warships appear one day off the shore of a foreign nation. No war
has been declared and none is intended. The ships are there to fore-
stall a communist threat to the security of the United States. In
the ensuing bombardment, the warehouse of an American firm are
destroyed. The injury is regrettable, yet there is serious question
whether the injured firm has any remedy in the American courts.
In Durand v. Hollins,139 an American businessman was unsuccessful
in his suit for damages against the commander of an American
naval vessel which had damaged his property in the course of
bombarding the port of San Juan del Norte (Greytown), Nicara-
gua, under government orders, in order to chastize local authori-
ties who had failed to make reparation for an attack by a mob on
the United States consul of the place.
40
Other instances are legion. An American airline engaged in
the lucrative trans-Atlantic business finds its landing rights in a
foreign country threatened with suspension in retaliation for the
refusal of the Civil Aeronautics Board to approve a fare voted by
the members of the International Air Transport Organization. An
American firm developing a market in military products abroad
finds itself priced out of the market by salesmen from the Depart-
ment of Defense embarked on a vast program of selling American
equipment to allied nations.' 41 American firms forced to raise
funds abroad because of the President's foreign investment guide-
lines may on that account find their projects curtailed or defeated
by angry local governments embarrassed by the rising cost of
tion of the license terms, upon payment of appropriate sums to the public
utility. 16 U.S.C.A. § 807 (1964). See United States v. Appalachian Power
Co., 311 U.S. 377, 427 (1940).
138. The power of Congress to regulate "commerce with foreign na-
tions" comprehends every species of commercial intercourse. Board of
Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933).
139. 8 Fed. Cas. 111 (No. 4186) (S.D. N.Y. 1860).
140. A long list of similar episodes, extending over the period from
the undeclared war against France in 1798 to Pearl Harbor in 1941 may
be found in ROGERS, WORLD POLICING AND THE CONSTITUTION (1945). See
also, CLARK, RIGHT TO PROTECT CITIZENS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES BY LANDING
FORCES (1913).
141. For a recital of complaints by private corporations against gov-
ernment competition, see Hearings on S. 2996 Before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, 87 Cong., 2d Sess. 471-485 (1962).
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funds for both the private 142 and public sector 143 resulting from
the guideline program.14 An American firm which has supplied
an underdeveloped country with a particular manufacture for many
years may find its market totally destroyed by the local construc-
tion of a plant, with American government funds, which has suf-
ficient capacity to meet all of the country's needs. Trade with a
Latin American country is suddenly embargoed because the local
government has been taken over by communists.
145
The fifth amendment, which provides that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, con-
stitutes a restraint upon both Congress and the President. 1 46  Pri-
vate corporations are entitled to its protection. 147  This does not
mean that they are entitled to a particular type of procedural
relief. "In all cases, that kind of procedure is due process of law
which is suitable and proper to the nature of the case, and sanc-
tioned by the established customs and usages of the courts.' 148 Due
process means a hearing, and imports a judicial review of the action
of administrative or executive officers involved. All of this sounds
comforting; however, the value of these procedural remedies de-
pends upon whether the governmental action complained of is one
reviewable at all by the courts.
The question of just compensation is judicial, 49 but it is a mat-
ter of legislative discretion as to what tribunal will hear the
case. 150 The extent to which the power will be exercised is initially
a matter of legislative discretion.' 5 ' Whether the judiciary have
power to review a legislative determination that property is being
taken for a public use is not entirely clear.5 2 If property is taken
by the United States in the lawful exercise of the power of eminent
142. For an account of the possible impact of the March 1965 foreign
investment guidelines on Norway's shipbuilding industry which had be-
come dependent upon funds from American banks, see America's Restric-
tions Bite, The Economist, May 29, 1965, p. 1064.
143. See European Coal, Steel Group Postpones Plan for $20 Million
Loan, Wall Street Journal, December 20, 1965, p. 18.
144. This aggravates the growing concern of some developed nations
over the role of giant American firms in local industry. See Capital Atti-
tudes, The Economist, August 14, 1965, pp. 625-627.
145. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964);
United States v. The William, 28 Fed. Cas. 614, 620-623 (No. 16,700) (D.
Mass. 1808).
146. United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883); United States
v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241 (1946).
147. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 719 (1879). The due process
provision finds its roots in Chapter 39 of Magna Carta signed by King
John in the presence of prelates of the Church and barons 650 years ago.
148. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 289 (1883).
149. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327
(1893).
150. United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (1833).
151. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 298 (1893).
152. See United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546 (1946).
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domain, but without condemnation proceedings, the owner may
bring suit for just compensation in the court of claims or a United
States district court under the Tucker Act. 153 Where the govern-
ment impresses property into public use in time of war or public
danger without its owner's consent, there is an implied promise on
the part of the United States to reimburse the owner.
5 4
Should the government unlawfully seize property and attempt
to hold it without paying just compensation, the courts will enter-
tain jurisdiction over a suit to eject the government officials. In
such manner did the eldest son of General Robert E. Lee prove his
right to possession of Arlington Hall, inherited from his grand-
father and arbitrarily confiscated for non-payment of taxes during
the Civil War.155
There are many occasions when private property rights are
destroyed or severely injured as a result of lawful actions of the
federal government 156 without any redress for damages. Slavery
and all property rights in slaves were abolished by President Lin-
coln's Emancipation Proclamation in 1863 and subsequent legisla-
tion including the fourteenth amendment. The liquor business
was abolished upon adoption of the eighteenth amendment.
15 7
Treasury notes were made legal tender during the Civil War in
payment of debts previously contracted. 158 Private contract provi-
sions calling for payment in gold coin were made invalid by statute
during the great depression of the 1930's. 159 Domestic restraints on
oil production'6" and oil import controls16 ' have sometimes reduced
the value of private property. The injuries resulting from these
government actions were and are deemed not a direct taking of
property requiring compensation but the consequential result of
the exercise of lawful powers of government. 16 2 Where injury is in
the form of the frustration of business opportunities, there may not
153. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
154. United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1871).
155. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
156. See United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943).
157. Mexico cited such examples against the United States during the
dispute arising out of the seizure of American oil properties by the Mex-
ican government. See GoRDoN, THE EXPROPRIATION OF FOREIGN-OWNED
PROPERTY IN MEXICO 160 (1941).
158. Legal Tender Cases, (Knox v. Lee), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551
(1871).
159. Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
160. The oil proration laws and regulations of individual producting
states are backed up by the Connolly "Hot Oil" Act, 49 Stat. 30 (1935),
15 U.S.C. §§ 715-715m (1964) designed to forbid the interstate movement
of oil produced in violation of those regulations.
161. E.g., a Tidewater Oil Company refinery constructed on the east
coast and designed to handle crude oil from the Middle East could not
operate at design capacity due to import restraints.
162. Henderson v. Bryan, 46 F. Supp. 682 (S.D. Cal. 1942). But there
are limits, however vague, to the non-compensable exercise of the police
power. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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be compensation because: "In the absence of a statutory mandate
the sovereign must pay only for what it takes, not for opportunities
which the owner may lose."'16
When the government takes property in the exercise of its war
power, the right of redress may be very small if non-existent. The
affected firm may find that its right to recovery is limited by a
court which compares its claim for damages against the uncompen-
sated loss of life, liberty and property suffered by other American
nationals in wartime. 6 4 While the fifth amendment is not sus-
pended in time of war,10 5 damages incident to actual battle are not
compensable. 16 The rights of the nation to self defense and self
preservation have been held to have no connection with the right of
eminent domain. Consequently, they are beyond the reach of the
Constitution to compel redress.
1 67
The law has failed to keep pace with present-day world political
conditions. Various undeclared wars appear to be the norm, yet
the law provides no workable distinction between cases when dam-
ages are compensable' 68 and cases when they are not.169 The re-
sult is that the area of non-compensable injury has greatly widened.
A corporation engaged in foreign trade is interested principally
in remaining in business and in expanding that business as economic
conditions warrant. In the present state of the law, an American
corporation anticipating injury or even the extinction of its busi-
ness as a result of activities of the American government in foreign
trade is unable through the courts to enjoin the implementing fed-
eral officials to avoid the injury. Nor is the corporation entitled as
a matter of right to prior consultation with the government, so
that the injury might be mitigated or avoided, 70 although recent
Presidents have adopted the practice of consulting business leaders
on many problems.
171
Investment guarantees may be available to protect the Ameri-
can corporation against certain injuries caused by foreign govern-
163. United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 281 (1942).
164. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
165. See Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469 (1947);
Becker Steel Co. v. Cummings, 296 U.S. 74 (1935).
166. See Caltex (Phillipines), Inc. v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 970
(Ct. Cl. 1951).
167. See Grant v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 41, 2 Ct. Cl. 551 (1868); Cf.,
United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 234 (1887).
168. See Caltex (Phillipines), Inc. v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 970
(Ct. Cl. 1951).
169. War inevitably produces hardships, suffering and loss. St. Regis
Paper Co. v. United States, 110 Ct. Cl. 271, 76 F. Supp. 831 (1948).
170. Firms interested in tariff reforms arising out of the Kennedy
Round of negotiations at G.A.T.T. have been afforded an opportunity to
argue their cause before final decisions are made. But this is the excep-
tional case.
171. E.g., Report to the President on the White House Conference on
Export Expansion, September 17 and 18, 1963.
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ments, but there is no like remedy available against similar injuries
caused the same firms by the United States. The corporation is
left to the dubious remedy of damages after the event, provided it
is able to prove that the injury represents a taking of property for
which compensation is required under the fifth amendment, a tort
remediable under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 7 2 or the violation
of a contract with the government giving rise to a suit for damages.
As a general rule, the federal government may not be sued with-
out its consent. 17 3 If the corporation has a contract with the United
States calling for sales or services, suit may be brought on the con-
tract if the government does not carry out its part of the bargain.
1 74
If a person experiences damages sounding in tort, he may be able to
sue the United States in the Court of Claims or in a United
States District Court under The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1947.'17
But there are exceptions under this statute important to our dis-
cussion. Thus a corporation may not bring a suit under this statute
where injury is caused by an employee of the government who exer-
cises due care in the execution of a statute or regulation, "whether
or not such statute or regulation be valid."'7 6 Further, suits may
not be brought under the statute for injuries caused by interfer-
ence with contract rights, or on a claim arising in a foreign country,
or for combat injuries during time of war.-
77
Under such circumstances, one may reasonably expect that the
corporation will do its utmost through persuasion of government
officials to head off injurious conduct or to mold government policy
along lines conducive to the maximum well-being of the corpora-
tion's foreign activities and its overall economic health. In view of
the important role that these corporations play in terms of the
prosperity of the domestic economy and the success of foreign pol-
icy, it cannot be said that their powers of persuasion are small.
At least this has sometimes been the experience of our government
during the present century.
CONCLUSION
It would seem to be in the public interest, of the United States,
as well as affected foreign countries, for the foreign activities of
American corporations to be consistent with and even to support the
foreign policy of the United States as established by Congress and
the President. 78  At the least, they should not be allowed to undo
172. Federal Tort Claims Act, 60 Stat. 842 (1946), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291,
1346(b) (c), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411(b), 2412(c), 2671-80
(1964).
173. Kawananakoa v. Polyblack, 205 U.S. 349 (1907).
174. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
175. See WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT (1957).
176. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(b) (1964).
177. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(h),(j) & (k) (1964).
178. See Kronstein, Government & Business in International Trade, in
CORPORATION TAKE-OVER 150 (1964).
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that policy. Assuming these propositions to be true, the present
instruments for assuring the attainment of such ends are inade-
quate whether viewed from the side of the corporation or of the
federal government.
Despite their vast size and importance to the international
economy, 179 American corporations engage in foreign trade by suf-
ferance of the federal government. Opportunities abound for
injury to these corporations as the direct or indirect result of Ameri-
can foreign policies and their implementation. Yet they have no
right to prior consultation, no public insurance available against
such injuries, nor an adequate forum for redress.18 0  With no
charter from or contract with the federal government which re-
quires respect for their rights to trade in foreign commerce, they
have very little legal protection against drastic changes in govern-
ment policies affecting them.
The fact that the federal government is not the source of the
charters of the corporations can only serve to dull the federal gov-
ernment's sense of responsibility for their actions abroad. The ab-
sence of any patent obligation to respect their investments and
business opportunities may foster an indifference as to the impact of
American governmental actions upon any one of them.
This is not a healthy situation. It is essentially a problem of
power and its legitimate and just use. The power of American cor-
porations for good and evil in foreign trade grows at a rapid rate,
accenting the need for accountability.'"' The role the American
government is called upon to play in foreign affairs augurs a major
collision between these two powers. And in that ultimate struggle,
it is submitted that the corporations will prove to be luxuriant
plants with stems of straw.
A major clash could be followed by the speedy enactment of
hastily considered legislation against state-chartered corporations,
designed to assure in the future the compatibility of their foreign
activities with those of the United States Government. But the
problems are so complex and the impact of any such action so far-
179. "Almost the entire flow of U.S. direct investment to Latin Amer-
ica has come from somewhat over 300 large corporations." STUDY PREPARED
FOR SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE oN AMERICAN REPUBLICS' AFFAIRS, SENATE COM-
MITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.; UNITED STATEs-LATIN
AMERICAN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES BUSINESS AND LABOR IN LATIN AMER-
ICA VIII (Comm. Print 1960). See also Miller, The Corporation as a Private
Government in the World Community, 57 VA. L. REV. 1539 (1960).
180. See Timberg, Wanted: Administrative Safeguards for Protec-
tion of Individual in Economic Regulation, 17 ADMiN. L. REV. 159 (1965).
181. In debates on the East India Bill in 1783, Edmund Burke insisted
that the powers of The East India Company were a trust "and it is of the
very essence of every trust to be rendered accountable; and even to totally
cease, when it substantially varies from the purposes for which alone it
could have a lawful existence." 2 BURKE, SPEECHES 411 (1816).
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reaching that we should not wait for this to happen. The subject
should be discussed by Congress during the present period of tran-
quility in government-corporation relations to the end that ac-
countability and responsibility may be assured on both sides.
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